A New World Order Imagined: the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment's Invention of "Rogue States"

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We are going to do a terrible thing to you — we are going to deprive you of an enemy.
-Georgy Arbatov, Senior Advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking to U.S. counterparts, 1988

Who are the villains in our national life? And if we become unsure of that, well then, who are we?
-Charles Paul Freund, 1988

The end of the Cold War did not bring us to the millennium of peace.
-President William J. Clinton, September 27th, 1993

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Introduction

On a Thursday morning in February of 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright walked into a lecture classroom full of cheering Tennessee State University students. They had come to hear her speak about U.S. policy toward Iraq. At the time, Saddam Hussein was continuing to block United Nations weapons inspectors from accessing eight sites in Iraq. Albright began her lecture by describing what she saw as the four categories of states in the international system. The first group, she claimed, was composed of countries who "understand the rules" and follow them. The second group was made up of what she called "countries in transition," which had previously been part of empires and strove to join that first group. "The third group," Albright said, "are the rogue states — those that not only do not have a part in the international system, but whose very being involves being outside of it and throwing, literally, hand grenades inside in order to destroy it." The fourth group were failed states which had no structure whatsoever. According to Albright, the long term goal of U.S. foreign policy should be to bring all of the world into that first group. In order to do so, the United States needed to "isolate the rogues and then try to reform them."  

Over the course of the 1990s, American foreign policy thinkers and policymakers categorized a group of states — usually Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea — as its own distinct class of states in the international system. These states were cast as "rogue states," states which behaved dangerously and erratically, did not abide by international law, exported terrorism, and

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pursued weapons of mass destruction. According to those who used the term, "rogue states" did not only oppose the liberal international order; their very existence threatened to obliterate it.

The word "rogue" is derived from *rogare*, the Latin word for "to ask, to beg." At some point, *rogare* shifted into *roger*, a mid-sixteenth century English word used to describe a begging vagrant who pretends to be a poor scholar from Cambridge or Oxford. "Rogue" is likely a shortened version of *rogare*, and came to be used from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries to mean "an idle vagrant" or "a dishonest, unprincipled person; a rascal, a scoundrel." At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the figurative term "rogue elephant" emerged. A rogue elephant was an elephant that lived apart from the herd and had "savage or destructive tendencies." By the second half of the twentieth century, "rogue" came to mean "without control or discipline; behaving abnormally or dangerously; erratic, unpredictable."5

The concept of rogue states is rooted in earlier American traditions of "evilizing" the enemy.6 Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union the "evil empire," and before that, Franklin D. Roosevelt portrayed Nazi Germany and Japan as "powerful and resourceful gangsters" who banded together to dominate the world.7 Such evilization served to mobilize public support for war and characterize international politics as a clash between good and evil. American policymakers' demonization of the Soviet Union during the Cold War was aptly described by French philosopher Raymond Aron as the "mobilization of moralism," without which, according

6 Harald Müller, "Evilization in Liberal Discourse: From Kant's 'Unjust Enemy' to Today's 'Rogue State,'" *International Politics* 51, no. 4 (July 2014).
to Aron, the global strategy of containment would be impossible. But America's evilization of its enemies has also worked to construct American national identity. A nation's self-definition is often formulated through contradistinction with an enemy state, a state that embodies characteristics that the other nation decidedly lacks. By constructing an image of the enemy that is unequivocally cruel and dangerous, policymakers engage in what sociologist Gabriel Weimman calls "the theater of terror" — the act of "reducing ambiguous or unknown phenomena to a familiar, brutal, and dramatic format." Such enemy construction requires simplification and hyperbole in order to render the United States a crusader against the evils of the world.

Earlier synonyms of "rogue states," such as "pariah states," "renegade states," and "outlaw states," were used by U.S. policymakers starting in the 1980s in response to increased fears about terrorism triggered by attacks on Americans and American installations in Beirut, El Salvador, Belgium, West Germany, and France. President Ronald Reagan argued that these terrorist attacks were the coordinated work of a confederation of five "outlaw states" in the Third World — Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua — which were all united by one criminal phenomenon: "their fanatical hatred of the United States." These "outlaw states," according to Reagan, were "run by the strangest collection of misfits, looney tunes, and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich." Similarly, George H.W. Bush used the terms "pariah state," "outlaw state," and "renegade rulers" to describe Third World countries pursuing

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weapons of mass destruction. These terms, though similar to "rogue states," were not fully developed categories. The notion that these states constituted a class of states in the international system was incomplete.

It was not until the mid-1990s when "rogue states" became an identifiable category in foreign policy speeches and in the think tank world of Washington, D.C. As I will argue in this thesis, the rogue states concept was contingent on its time. It emerged from the United States' identity crisis at the end of the Cold War. These Third-World regional powers and their allegedly problematic behavior were not a new development, nor a new feature of the international system. Designating these countries as a distinct class of states, therefore, had less to do with the states and their behavior, and more to do with America's search for a coherent identity.

This thesis traces the intellectual threads of the concept of rogue states. It will examine how the category of rogue states ascended into the U.S. foreign policy threat vocabulary. In doing so, I will argue that the construction of rogue states was an attempt to rectify the United States' post-Cold War role confusion. Rogue states emerged to fill a gap in national purpose and to meet the demands of partisan politics, public apathy, and national self-definition.

Scholarship on the concept of rogue states, much of which was written in the late 1990s and early 2000s, has tended to be prescriptive and policy-oriented. I hope to intervene in this scholarship by writing an intellectual history which explores how the concept of rogue states became a predominant way for foreign policymakers and thinkers to frame the world order and the major threats to that order. Indeed, this thesis will be the first intellectual history of the concept of rogue states.

A key difference between this project and policy-oriented works about rogue states lies in how one views the category of rogue states itself. Most scholarship on rogue states starts from the assumption that they are an objectively real characteristic of the world order, and that "rogue"-ness is an intrinsic quality of certain states. Works such as T. Henriksen's *America and the Rogue States*, and Alexander T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss' *Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea*, use international relations theories to argue for particular policies toward these troublesome states. Both incorporate ideas of "resocialization," a concept coined by political scientist Alexander L. George, which prescribes certain strategies for reforming outlaw states and introducing them to global norms before accepting them into international society. Rather than accepting rogue states as a fundamental feature of the world order, I will study them as a historical idea that was constructed and developed through political processes and intellectual thought.

The most prominent scholar on rogue states is Robert S. Litwak, a political scientist and former National Security Council staffer. In 2000, Litwak wrote *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War*, a book in which he argues that the rogue state concept is counterproductive because it lumps together and demonizes a group of disparate states. Instead of applying a one-size-fits-all containment strategy to these problem states, Litwak argues that the United States should adopt a differentiated strategy that can account for their differences and bring them back into the "family of nations." My thesis, as a historical project, does not attempt to make policy recommendations for dealing with such states.

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I build upon Michael Klare's 1995 book *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy*, which traces the Pentagon's construction of a new enemy as the Cold War came to an end. According to Klare, without the Soviet Union, the Pentagon faced a "threat blank." To fill that gap in purpose, it found a way to "elevate some previously neglected potential threats" — rising regional powers in the Third World— into major adversaries.¹⁵ Klare argues that the concept of rogue states was ultimately an invention of the U.S. military establishment in an attempt to convert, rather than dismantle, the existing military apparatus that had been geared toward the Soviet threat for the past four decades. I am inspired by Klare's analysis of threat construction, and was lucky enough to speak with him about my project. Notably, his book was written as the construction of rogue states was still ongoing, and before the term "rogue states" reached its height. Therefore my thesis has the benefit of time and will focus on foreign policy thinkers at all ends of the establishment, not just at the Pentagon.

Another key work on rogue states is *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine*, written by Alex Miles, a politics lecturer at Liverpool John Moores University. In this work, Miles focuses on the consequences of what he calls the "rogue state doctrine," an approach of the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations which made it nearly impossible to pursue diplomacy with states designated as rogues.¹⁶ He argues that the rogue state doctrine set the conditions for both administrations to pursue a regime-change-or-nothing approach to Iraq, and highlights the difficulties that the United States faced in selling the doctrine to its allies in Europe.

There are several pieces missing in this scholarship of rogue states. First, aside from Michael Klare's book, there is no comprehensive work that views the rogue states concept as a

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deliberate decision by policymakers. My intervention will take a similar approach as Klare's did, but instead of focusing solely on the role of U.S. military generals, I will explore the foreign policy thinkers of the broader establishment, from academic, media, and think tank spaces, to Congress and the White House. This project also aims to investigate why the term "rogue states" had political currency at the time. Why did foreign policy thinkers and politicians believe that mobilizing opposition against this group of states would serve their (or America's) interests?

A key limitation of this project, and of historical research more broadly, is the number of approaches one can take to understand phenomena of the past. There are multiple frames of analysis that could be applied to study the emergence of the rogue states concept. I choose to study the development from an epistemological perspective, and argue that the concept was born out of the U.S. foreign policy establishment's uncertainty and confusion as the Soviet Union fell apart. The concept was an invention that attempted to fill a void in America's contested national identity. One could, however, apply an economic analysis to the concept's emergence. At the same time that the rogue states concept reached its height, the Clinton administration was emphatically expanding globalization and free trade. Thus, one could argue that foreign policy thinkers saw these "rogue states" as serious threats to the stability and accessibility of markets. Such an approach would need to show that the rogue states category was created as part of an effort to maintain stable investment climates around the world and open up new global markets. I bear this approach in mind, but I do not pursue it in any great detail.

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter explores the foreign policy establishment's identity crisis in the three years of the Soviet Union's collapse, 1989 to 1992. I showcase this identity crisis by following the thinking of two sectors of the establishment — military planners working in the George H.W. Bush administration, and foreign policy thinkers at
the Council on Foreign Relations. Quickly after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, military planners at Bush's Pentagon strategized a new defense paradigm that would replace the blueprint of the past forty-five years: defense against Third World regional powers who were quickly pursuing weapons of mass destruction. This Third World threat laid the foundation for the rogue states category that emerged in the greater foreign policy establishment a few years later. In this chapter, I also trace the thinking of the academics who took part in the Council on Foreign Relations' Project on America's Task in a Changed World. This unsuccessful Project, which aimed to re-think the United States' role in the world, uncovers the deep identity crisis felt by the foreign policy establishment due to America's loss of an enemy. I use archival documents from the Council on Foreign Relations' Records that have only recently been made available and, to the best of my knowledge, have never been used before in scholarship.

The second chapter explores how the Democratic Party faced its own identity crisis starting in 1988, after its third consecutive loss in presidential elections. The Democratic Leadership Council, an organization whose purpose was to pull the Democratic Party to the center, and its brainchild, the Progressive Policy Institute, worked to generate ideas about America's role in the world that could regain the presidential majority. These New Democrat organizations called for the promotion of democracy to replace the strategy of containment in a post-Cold War world. A foreign policy for democracy, they argued, would be necessary for garnering bipartisan support for U.S. global leadership, and hastening the Democrats' return to the White House. Clinton emerged from this political project and directly adopted the Progressive Policy Institute's foreign policy ideas. In the New Democrats' conception, the strategy of enlarging the world's democracies required the flipside: containing and transforming
states that did not fit into the democracy model. In this chapter, I show a direct thread between the Democrats' search for a new identity and the development of the rogue states category.

The third chapter examines the Republican Revolution of 1994, in which the GOP swept the midterm elections. The Republican Revolution introduced an influx of freshman Republicans who preferred a more unilateral U.S. foreign policy, opposed Clinton's United Nations peacekeeping operations, and threatened to cut foreign aid and other foreign policy initiatives. Clinton casted these Republicans as "the new isolationists." As I demonstrate with data, the term "rogue states" entered the Clinton administration's vocabulary just as Clinton's national security team launched a rhetorical attack against these "new isolationists." Public opinion polling shows that this was a moment in which Americans were especially uninterested in and apathetic about the promotion of democracy abroad. I show that congressional politics and the specter of isolationism spurred the Clinton administration to embrace the concept of "rogue states."

Finally, in the conclusion, I connect the rogue states concept to the War on Terror and argue that George W. Bush was able to construct the enemy of terrorism more easily because of the previous administration's construction of the threat of rogue states. In other words, the rogue state concept made the War on Terror rhetorically possible. It is my hope that this thesis sheds insight on America's decision to seek military dominance after its Cold War victory. Out of all instances in which the United States used military force since 1946, about eighty percent occurred after 1991. Though a multitude of factors have encouraged such interventions, it is the

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foreign policy establishment that is responsible for producing the *intellectual* support for endless war. This thesis is a part of that story.
I. "Where Did All Our Villains Go?"
America's Identity Crisis in the Twilight of the Cold War

In December of 1988, *Washington Post* editor Charles Paul Freund wrote an article entitled: "Where Did All Our Villains Go?" In it he argued that America was losing its enemy. With his arms reduction and reformist policies of glasnost and perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev was "taking the scowl off the Soviet face." The Soviets had given up on their proxy war in Afghanistan, Mao's China was liberalizing its economy, and communism was no longer a viable threat. "We may unexpectedly be finding it harder to answer a pair of extremely basic questions," Freund wrote. "Who are the villains in our national life? And if we become unsure of that, well then, who are we?"¹⁹

The collapse of the Soviet Union over the next three years precipitated an identity crisis for the American foreign policy establishment. Feelings of euphoria and triumph after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 quickly gave way to confusion and aimlessness. The Soviet Union, America's "perfect ideological enemy" which had become a crucible of its national identity, was crumbling from the inside out.²⁰ Now it was unclear what the United States stood for, without the existence of an antithesis. Some foreign policy thinkers argued that with the decline of the Soviet threat, the United States could now embrace a non-interventionist foreign policy, reduce its global responsibilities, and focus on domestic issues.²¹ Others hoped for an

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expansion of American leadership but struggled to justify the expenditure of time and resources on foreign interventions. After all, what purpose would U.S. dominance serve in a world no longer entangled in the superpower rivalry that had defined the past forty-five years?

After the Fall of the Berlin Wall, foreign policy pundits debated about whether America was facing a moment of decline or renewal. There was little consensus about whether to celebrate the end of the Cold War or mourn it. In a pessimistic essay titled "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," international relations scholar John J. Mearsheimer claimed that America would long for the peace and stability that the superpower conflict had provided. Now, according to Mearsheimer, this order would give way to the dangerous anarchy of international relations. Establishment thinkers debated whether the threat of totalitarianism had really diminished.

Francis Fukuyama, then a thirty-six year old foreign policy analyst on his way to a post in the State Department, was particularly optimistic about the end of the Cold War. In his provocative essay "The End of History?", published in the Summer of 1989, he proclaimed that with the demise of Marxism-Leninism, humanity had reached "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution," and Western liberal democracy was now the final, universal form of human government. In Fukuyama's view, the end of history did not mark the end of military conflict. But it did mean that the nations of the world would converge in a trend toward democracy. Fukuyama's thesis did not, however, hold up with the developments of the 1990s.

From 1989 to 1992, military planners and foreign policy academics strategized America's role in the post-Cold War world. A group of military generals in George H.W. Bush's Pentagon

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devised a new threat that could fill the military's gap in purpose — smaller states in the Third World that sought regional power and were quickly pursuing weapons of mass destruction.

For the Pentagon, the Soviet Union's collapse was a problem. The Soviet enemy had undergirded the entire U.S. military apparatus; the Pentagon's spending, operations, strategies, and even weapons were geared toward countering the Soviet Union. Thus, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Pentagon planners found their work had come to a head. According to a longtime Pentagon advisor William W. Kaufmann, civilian and military leaders were seized by an "identity crisis," and were left "rudderless… scrambling to justify the approximate current force structure and all these glamorous programs." General Colin Powell later noted that for most of his life, the Pentagon's greatest concern was "World War Three" with "an empire that had worldwide ambitions." Though this threat was dire, it was "a known situation." In a rapid change of events, that situation was suddenly all "gone."

Congress pushed the Pentagon to review its objectives and strategies with respect to the world's abrupt transformations. When the Bush administration submitted its FY 1991 Defense Budget, Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, delivered a statement to the Senate on the gaping holes in the Pentagon's spending plan for the next year. According to Nunn, there was a glaring "threat blank" in the Pentagon's operations. "We have a fiscal year 1991 defense budget that is based on a 1988 threat and a 1988 strategy," Nunn said. He also noted that the Pentagon had only provided "fragmentary answers" to essential questions about how changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union would affect the U.S. military structure. "What new threats have to be encountered in the future?" Nunn asked. He insisted that

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the Pentagon’s plans were "rooted in the past," and needed to be updated to fit the changing strategic landscape.\textsuperscript{28} Though Secretary Cheney protested Congress' "complaints instead of solutions," he and his staff got to work on drafting a new defense strategy.\textsuperscript{29}

The Pentagon's new strategy, known as the Regional Defense Strategy, was adopted by General Powell and his staff in the Spring of 1990, and received White House approval by the Summer.\textsuperscript{30} The strategy called for a reconfiguration of the military structure to strengthen "power projection": the ability to exert force on remote and unfamiliar battlefields.\textsuperscript{31} It proposed for the military to improve its ability to "terminate conflicts swiftly," by rapidly deploying troops to far-away areas and exercising technological superiority in its weapons.\textsuperscript{32} Powell's plan would reorganize the Cold War military structure into a Base Force of 1.6 million men and women, including "power projection forces" that were ready to be deployed to distant conflict zones.\textsuperscript{33}

In June, \textit{U.S. News \& World Report} named Saddam Hussein the World's Most Dangerous Man.\textsuperscript{34} His pursuit of chemical and nuclear arms and quest for power in the Middle East did not go unnoticed by the Pentagon. In fact, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida had already begun training for a future war with Iraq, using battle simulations to test out war scenarios.\textsuperscript{35} The Pentagon admitted in 1992 that "the basic concepts for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were established before a single Iraqi soldier entered Kuwait."\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{32} ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{35} William Suit, "The Logistics of Air Power Projection," \textit{Air Power History} 38, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 9-20, 11.
\end{flushright}
On August 2nd, 1990, at approximately 2 A.M. local time, Saddam Hussein ordered more than 100,000 Iraqi troops to invade their small, oil-rich neighbor Kuwait. Iraqi forces captured most of Kuwaiti City within hours and announced the establishment of a provincial government over Baghdad Radio. The next day, Bush announced that the U.S. military needed to be tailored to counter serious threats "wholly unrelated to earlier patterns of the U.S.-Soviet relationship." To Bush, Hussein's aggression confirmed that "terrorism, hostagetaking, renegade regimes, and unpredictable rulers" posed the new threat to global security. These threats could "arise suddenly, unpredictably, and from unexpected quarters." Therefore, Bush argued, U.S. forces would need to be capable of being rapidly deployed to any corner of the globe.

In what it claimed was a wholly defensive mission, the Bush administration began to station troops in Saudi Arabia, as Secretary of State James Baker worked to patch together a U.N. coalition. The final coalition of thirty-nine nations was the largest military coalition since World War Two. On November 29th, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 678, which called for the use of "all necessary means" to force Iraq out of Kuwait if it did not withdraw by January 15th.

Operation Desert Storm was an answer to the question of whether the United States faced a moment of decline or renewal. Early in the morning of January 17th, the United States and its U.N. coalition launched a military campaign of air and missile attacks on targets in Iraq and Kuwait. The operation was partially guided by a strategy called "Instant Thunder," which

called for a swift and overwhelming air raid that would "decapitate" the enemy and destroy Iraq's ability to wage war.\textsuperscript{41}

But Operation Desert Storm was about more than just Iraq. As a January 18 editorial in the \textit{Wall Street Journal} stated, “the most significant gain of all will come if America, and above all its elite, recover a sense of self-confidence and self-worth.”\textsuperscript{42} Two days after the launch of the operation, Powell and Cheney warned the public against early euphoria.\textsuperscript{43} The reality on the ground, however, was clear: the coalition was unquestionably destroying Iraqi forces. As a senior commander put it, "We had the perfect coalition, the perfect infrastructure, and the perfect battlefield."\textsuperscript{44} The war was a testing ground for new defense technology, including airborne surveillance systems that could locate enemy forces twenty-four hours a day, precision guided munitions, and night vision capabilities.\textsuperscript{45} The successful application of these new technologies led the Pentagon to declare a "military-technological revolution in warfare" that would transform the way that America fought wars in the decades to come.\textsuperscript{46}

To the Bush administration, Desert Storm was a model for the threats and battles of the future. Testifying before Congress after the war, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney argued that the Gulf War "presages the type of conflict we are most likely to confront again...major regional contingencies against foes well-armed with advanced conventional and unconventional munitions."\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, Bush said that Iraq was "a test case for the most difficult security

\textsuperscript{46} ibid, 164.
challenges we are likely to face in the future… From Qadhafi in Libya to Kim Il-Sung in North Korea, the threats on our horizon could look a lot like the threat we turned back in Iraq. In the months following Desert Storm, the Pentagon voiced increased concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to unstable states in the Third World. The construction of this new proliferation threat coalesced with concern about preventing "Iraqs of the future." Even though the word "rogue state" was rarely used by Bush's Pentagon strategists, their blueprint for future Third World threats in the model of Iraq would serve as the foundation of the rogue state category which emerged later in the decade.

Bush trumpeted the importance of Desert Storm in his 1991 State of the Union address, which he delivered just as the ground operation gathered steam. "What is at stake here," Bush said, "is more than one small country, it is a big idea — a new world order… where brutality will go unrewarded, and aggression will meet collective resistance." He portrayed America's leadership as indisputable. According to Bush, before U.S. troops left for Iraq "it was still fashionable" to question America's power and resolve. Now, because of the victory, "no one in the whole word doubts us anymore." Many in the foreign policy establishment, including Bush himself, declared that victory in the Gulf represented the end of Vietnam Syndrome. According to them, the war had revitalized faith in the American military and its ability to impose stability in the world.

But perhaps Bush's proclamation of a New World Order was too ambitious. His own Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, provided a less confident assessment of America's position. He argued that public support for interventionism would not be "automatic" following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. "It will not be immediately apparent to most Americans why we should continue to shoulder global responsibilities." Even if Americans did support American leadership in world affairs, there was little order in the early years of the nineties. The world was undergoing intense transformations. New states were forming out of the disintegrating Soviet bloc, the former Yugoslavia erupted in multiple civil wars, and, right off the coast of the U.S., Haitian military forces carried out a coup d'etat against their President. The new world was not ordered— it was a world of chaos. In a project lasting from 1991 to 1992, a group of academics assembled by the Council on Foreign Relations aspired to sort through this New World Disorder.

In January of 1991, as George H.W. Bush announced Operation Desert Storm, Gregory Treverton of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) wrote a concept paper for Pew Charitable Trusts. Pew was looking to fund a group of academics to rethink global security in a post-Cold War world, and Treverton had a vision. He proposed for Pew to sponsor an "International Task Force" composed of historians, journalists, political scientists, economists, and policymakers that would undertake a significant intellectual challenge: re-evaluating America's role in a changed world.

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world. The goal of the project, in Treverton's view, was two-fold. First, the Task Force would devise over-the-horizon recommendations for the next ten years of U.S. foreign policy. And, secondly, it would "use both public and private forums to advance acceptance of these recommendations." The Project was to be a three-year endeavor, and the Task Force would meet two or three times annually, as well as more frequently in smaller working groups. "The post-Cold War redefinition of security is just beginning," Treverton wrote in his paper. He noted that the loss of the "familiar enemy" had not brought peace, and in fact, the number of conflicts around the globe "may increase as the heavy hand of the Cold War lifts." Therefore, the Task Force would think hard and originally, beyond Cold War orthodoxies, about what the changing world meant for national security. Pew Charitable Funds issued a $1.5 million dollar grant to the Council on Foreign Relations, and Treverton got to work on recruiting Task Force members and planning for the next three years.

Soon the Council decided to name its undertaking the Project on America's Task in a Changed World. Treverton was the Director and James Schlesinger, who served as the Director of the CIA and Secretary of Defense under Nixon and Ford, would chair the Task Force. After receiving Treverton's first list of potential members, the Pew funders expressed their concern about the composition of the Task Force, which looked to them "like the usual suspects likely to reproduce old thinking about U.S. national security, not foster new ideas." In response, Treverton added some non-American members, including Japanese diplomat Yukio Satoh and German journalist Josef Joffe. He sent invitations and ended up with a final list of thirty members. The Task Force included some big establishment figures, like Henry Kissinger,

Zbigniew Brzeziński, and Richard Helms. The Task Force's resident academics included Samuel P. Huntington, Ernest May, Paul Kennedy, and John Lewis Gaddis. Treverton also included some Congressmen, including Sam Nunn, who was then Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, William S. Cohen, who would later serve as Clinton's Secretary of Defense, Charles S. Robb, and Richard Lugar.

By December, the Council announced the Project on America's Task in a Changed World in a press release. In the announcement, Chairman James Schlesinger declared, "We are at a turning point now similar to the years after World War II when the United States had won a major war, the enemy was vanquished, and the future uncharted. If that was the period of creation, this is one of re-creation." In constructing the new Task Force, Schlesinger said, "we have looked for those who have experience with the past yet have not been imprisoned by it." He also argued that it was "early wishful thinking" to proclaim a new world order. "We Americans like order, it appeals to us," Schlesinger said. "This reordering of our foreign policy... will be painful, complicated, and confusing to the public and its elected leaders. We hope to cast some light in this murky process."

The Task Force held its first two-day meeting in July of 1991 at the Carnegie Endowment's building in Washington, D.C. According to Treverton, it was "rich, intellectual mayhem." The discussion had little structure or coherence. The Task Force members expressed a myriad of opinions and struggled to reach consensus in their debates. At the time, Task Force member John Lewis Gaddis wrote in his personal journal that "there was no clear effort to explain just what the purpose of the group is to be, or to set up ground rules for the discussion."

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This lack of structure made it "certainly difficult to get a handle on the proceedings," and several people left the meeting "a bit worried about what all of this [was] going to amount to." The group's discussion was "exploratory" and "meandering." In Treverton's words, "too much structure can be the enemy of fresh thought," so issues and questions were introduced and discussed freely.

In a memorandum sent from Treverton to the Task Force members, he wrote that the discussion's chaos was "testimony… to just how hard the intellectual challenge is; the changes afoot are breathtaking." Treverton recapped the meeting and expressed the difficulty of their mission:

I was struck, as I suspect you were too, by just how uncomfortable it is to begin again. Thinking through basics is hard, and the grooves of Cold War orthodoxy run deep. That made me, and perhaps you as well, mostly buoyed but occasionally disheartened by our conversation. It is both a luxury and a necessity to have three years to think through the issues we raised.

If the Task Force's first meeting had any focus, it was on the seemingly insurmountable question of America's role in a post-Cold War world. Some participants agreed that the end of the Cold War had reduced the price of national security: the United States could now have the same amount of security for cheaper. But, as one member pointed out, "If a precious commodity is now cheaper, why not buy much more of it? Why shouldn't the United States try to impose its notion of order on the world?" The group also discussed whether the American public would

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62 ibid.
64 Gregory Treverton to Jim Schlesinger, memorandum, July 30, 1991, Box 341, Folder 1, Council on Foreign Relations Studies Department Records, Public Policy Papers, Princeton Mudd Library.
sustain its support for activism abroad, even without the presence of a clear threat. The crux of the conversation was summed up by Treverton: "To what extent and how should the United States deploy its domestic resources — money, blood, and, perhaps most important, intellectual capital— in the world?" The Task Force debated how to strike a balance between global leadership and domestic needs.

Following their first meeting, the Task Force met in October for what ended up being "a more coherent discussion" than the first one, and held a few thematic workshops, one on the "Future of U.S. Nuclear Posture," and another on "Strategy and Forces for the 1990s." At the latter, former Navy general William Odom led a talk on the three options for a post-containment foreign policy: the United States could either pursue (1) a new isolationism; (2) Pax Americana, in which America oversees and enforces international peace; or (3) an economy of force, with global engagement but a discrimination among regions. According to Odom, Pax Americana would be an impractical choice because the American public would be unlikely to make the necessary sacrifices; in Odom's view, Americans lacked "a focused ideological fervor… the kind we enjoyed in opposing Soviet communism." Building public consensus on foreign policies was a constant concern in the Project's discussions.

After one workshop, the Project's Deputy Director, Patricia Ramsay, was surprised by how polished and organized the rapporteur's notes were. She requested for a more realistic note taking style, because the "very professionalism of the notes" disguised the "electricity and chaos of the actual meeting." In fact, to Ramsay the value was in the "roughness."

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69 Gregory Treverton to Patricia Ramsay, December 20, 1991, Box 341, Folder 2, Council on Foreign Relations Studies Department Records, Public Policy Papers, Princeton Mudd Library.
Council's passion for tumultuous debate, it soon became clear that this disorganized style would not successfully achieve the Project's goals of developing a reimagined U.S. foreign policy.

Within a year, the Project was falling apart. According to Patricia Ramsay, Steve Del Rosso of the Pew Charitable Funds was "not a happy funder." Even after the first meeting of the Task Force, Del Rosso was not impressed by the Project and was "left feeling that the group was not sure where it was going." The Pew funders expressed their concerns in a letter to the Project's leaders in June of 1992. To date, they argued, "the Project seems to lack intellectual cohesion and a sense of overall direction." The Task Force members were drawn from a "relatively narrow stratum" of the American foreign policy establishment and "do not represent a new generation of leadership." It was hard for the funders to see what intellectual threads were holding the series of individual meetings together. Ultimately, the funders wrote: "Is a task force of luminaries the best approach to re-thinking the assumptions upon which American foreign policy has been based for the past four and a half decades?" They pointed out that groups can effectively expand on an existing intellectual paradigm, but that "it is asking a great deal for such a group to explore new topics and operate on the frontiers of thought." The project was simply not meeting its stated objectives. It had not settled on a new direction for the United States in a post-Cold War world.

A key shortcoming of the Project was organizational. The Pew funders admitted that James Schlesinger was not a suitable Chairman. He often lacked engagement, and his meandering discussion style had proved unproductive, "directionless," and "empty of substance." Moreover, the Task Force was far too large and diffuse to be intellectually

70 Patricia Ramsay to Gregory Treverton, July 16, 1991, Box 341, Folder 1, Council on Foreign Relations Studies Department Records, Public Policy Papers, Princeton Mudd Library.

71 Catherine Kelleher and James A. Smith to John Encandela, Kevin Quagley, Peter Tarnoff, and Greg Treverton, June 5, 1992, Box 341, Folder 4, Council on Foreign Relations Studies Department Records, Public Policy Papers, Princeton Mudd Library.

72 Summary Notes from Pew-CFR Meeting.
productive.\textsuperscript{73} In June of 1992, the Pew Funders met with Council on Foreign Relations members and discussed whether to terminate the project or to consider a reworked version. In an attempt to salvage it, CFR changed the Chair and Director of the Project and decided to hold smaller, more focused working groups that could achieve more cohesiveness.\textsuperscript{74} Pew rejected this revised work plan, wishing to "make a clean break" with the CFR project.\textsuperscript{75} It decided to revoke the grant altogether.\textsuperscript{76}

After hearing of the Project's demise, Josef Joffe, a German thinker who had been a member of the Task Force, expressed his frustration to the President of Pew Charitable Funds, Thomas W. Langfitt. Joffe wrote that he was feeling "puzzled and dismayed." In spite of his confusion, he acknowledged that the entire Project was a "mistake," and that completing the project would be "more than frills and fun." He argued that there remained "a gaping deficit in the U.S. thinking about the management of the post-Cold War World." Re-imagining how to navigate the new, disorderly world would require some rigorous thinking, and "admittedly, the Group had spent half a year poking through the fog." Joffe concluded his letter by expressing his deeply-felt emotions evoked by the failure of the Project: "I came to the Project with great faith and enthusiasm, indeed, excitement," Joffe wrote, "And I walk away from it (not exactly voluntarily) with a sense of futility and dismay."\textsuperscript{77}

Joffe's letter highlights the foreign policy establishment's identity crisis in the closing years of the Cold War. Though excited by the transformations underway, foreign policy thinkers were disoriented and lost. For those involved in the Project on America's Task in a Changed

\textsuperscript{73} ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} John Lewis Gaddis, "Friday, July 17, 1992," excerpt from Gaddis' journal, unpublished.
\textsuperscript{76} Kevin F. F. Quigley to Peter Tarnoff, June 25, 1992, Box 342, Folder 7, Council on Foreign Relations Studies Department Records, Public Policy Papers, Princeton Mudd Library.
\textsuperscript{77} Josef Joffe to Thomas W. Langfitt, August 13 1991, Box 341, Folder 4, Council on Foreign Relations Studies Department Records, Public Policy Papers, Princeton Mudd Library.
World, the redefinition of the United States' role in the world proved to be a more daunting task than they anticipated. It required inventing an entirely new blueprint. Instead of achieving what it set out to do, CFR’s Project ended in intellectual stagnation. Around the same time that the Council engaged in its fruitless Project, a group of moderate Democrats were also strategizing America's role in the new world. Fresh inspiration was much needed for the establishment to move forward in constructing a consensus on U.S. foreign policy.

78 Memorandum to the Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz, September 24, 1992, Box 343, Folder 3, Council on Foreign Relations Studies Department Records, Public Policy Papers, Princeton Mudd Library.
II. In Search For a New Paradigm

The Rise of the New Democrats and a Successor to Containment

The presidential election of 1988 was a hard blow for the Democratic Party, with Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis receiving only 111 electoral votes to George H.W. Bush's 426. This was the third consecutive presidential election loss for the Democrats. Many observers attributed this loss to a general perception that the Party had moved too far to the left.\textsuperscript{79} The Party was in shambles, and it was up to the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) to pick up the pieces.

The DLC was an unofficial party organization formed by moderate Democrats after the Party's losses in the presidential elections of 1980 and 1984. Its purpose was to pull the Democratic Party in a centrist direction in order to appeal to swing voters and gain a presidential majority. DLC members saw themselves as the New Democrats, fighting to expand the party's base and advocate for a "Third Way" between traditional conservatism and liberalism.\textsuperscript{80} They adopted conservative, and traditionally Republican, stances on issues such as defense spending, budget deficits, crime, and free trade. Bill Clinton was involved in the DLC from his very beginnings, and served briefly as its Chairman before his presidential campaign in 1992.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{81} Al From, "Recruiting Bill Clinton," \textit{The Atlantic}, December 3, 2013.
After Dukakis' defeat, the DLC became a more permanent and institutionalized organization. It increased its membership to over 200, and in June of 1989, created its own think tank: the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI). PPI would be an intellectual hub for the New Democrats, helping to generate ideas for DLC-affiliated politicians and reinvent the Party. PPI's stated objective was to "fashion a new public philosophy that transcends the limits of the conventional, left-right debate." The "Progressive" in Progressive Policy Institute was something of a misnomer — DLC founder Al From admitted that he was "tired of having the DLC labeled as conservative," so he named its think tank the Progressive Policy Institute to make it more difficult for reporters to call it the "conservative Progressive Policy Institute."

Will Marshall, previously a speechwriter for DLC Congress members, was named PPI's President. He claimed that the think tank's goal was to "synthesize what's good about both the left and the right" and "push the political debate to the next frontier." The New Democrats borrowed heavily from conservatives— not just for policy stances, but also for the creation of PPI itself. PPI was modeled after the Heritage Foundation, the conservative think tank which revived the Republican Party in the 1970s and served as the key idea-generator for the Reagan administration. PPI aimed to become a Heritage-like organization for the next Democratic administration, producing policy ideas for the President and leveraging the DLC as its political and media machine. Soon after PPI's founding, the DLC created its own publication, Mainstream Democrat. With these developments, the New Democrats were ready to crystallize their ideology and launch a campaign to take back the White House.

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84 Al From, "Recruiting Bill Clinton."
PPI's first research priority was understanding the Democrats' 1988 defeat. Political scientists Elaine Karmack and William Galston collaborated on the think tank's inaugural report, *The Politics of Evasion*. Based on ABC polling analysis, Karmack and Galston concluded that the Democratic Party had "lost touch with the American public" and was now increasingly associated with a "liberal fundamentalism" that drove away white middle class voters. The polls showed that Dukakis was perceived as too far left. What the Party needed, according to Karmack, was to recognize that it had "an ideological problem" that demanded an "ideological solution."^87^

According to Karmak and Galston's report, one shortcoming of the Democratic Party was the popular perception that it was weak on defense. Nearly a quarter of voters — 22 percent— cited foreign policy and defense as their main concern, and 88 percent of those voters voted for Bush. Bush beat out Dukakis on 2 to 1 margins on 12 key defense issues. Indeed, the PPI report stated that the public perceived Democrats as exhibiting "ambivalence toward the assertion of American values and interests abroad."^88^ In order to get back into the White House, the Democrats would need to rehabilitate their national security reputation.

In Fall of 1989, even though Bush had just begun his presidency and the election of 1992 was years away, the New Democrats began to strategize on their path back to the White House. A few dozen Democratic politicians and thinkers convened at the Mayflower Hotel for a September conference on "The Politics of Message." For the fourth panel of the day, PPI President Will Marshall joined Madeleine Albright, who was then teaching at Georgetown but would later serve as Clinton's U.N. Ambassador and Secretary of State, to speak about

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^87^ Charles M. Madigan, "Democrats Searching For a Map to the White House," *Chicago Tribune*, September 17, 1989.

transforming the Democrats' ideas about foreign policy. According to Marshall, national security had become Republican terrain, and the Democrats had to reclaim it in order to compete in the presidential election. The central question, Marshall argued, was what doctrine would replace Cold War containment: "What is the organizing principle for a foreign policy that, for longer than I've been alive, has been geared toward the resistance of totalitarian expansionism and tyranny?" He claimed that a new foreign policy objective for the Democrats should be "fortifying the Democratic center in countries all over the world." Albright echoed Marshall's arguments and also characterized the post-Cold War world as a new, complicated, and dangerous era: "all the old rules are gone… We're all of a sudden threatened by irrational or non-state actors."\(^\text{89}\)

Restoring confidence in the electorate would require identifying these new threats and communicating a message about America's role in the world that resonated with the American public.

To land on a new message, the New Democrats solicited help from the other side of the aisle. They collaborated frequently with Reaganite conservatives and the think tank that inspired PPI: the Heritage Foundation. In October of 1991, for instance, PPI and the Heritage Foundation co-sponsored an event titled "Left and Right: A New Politics in the 1990s," where New Democrats and conservatives discussed their common ground and strategized ways to fuse together their ideologies into a "New Paradigm" blend of policies.\(^\text{90}\) This consolidation of left and right was pioneered in PPI's first foreign policy report: *An American Foreign Policy for Democracy*. The writer, Larry Diamond, was a conservative sociologist based at the Hoover Institution—his PPI report exemplified the alliance between the New Democrats and the


conservatives. Diamond's paper proposed for the United States to seize the post-Cold War opportunity to "shape the political character of the entire world." He argued that America faced a "critical turning point in history, a window of opportunity that is open as never before but could soon narrow or slam shut for years to come." The United States now had the ability to create a new, democratic world through the expansion of new institutions and global markets. He defined democracies as governments with free trade, free and fair elections, multiparty systems, and governmental accountability to the people. Diamond called for U.S. foreign policy to embrace democracy as its "central focus, the defining feature." Such a reorientation would offer the prospect for a truly bipartisan consensus. In its first foreign policy report, PPI appealed for moralism and idealism, in stark contrast to George H.W. Bush's embrace of realism and the balance of power. In December of 1991, while delivering a foreign policy campaign speech at Georgetown University, Arkansas Governor and Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton paraphrased much of Diamond's report. His foreign policy was already shaping up to be one that was a "Third Way": a foreign policy for democracy.

By the Summer of 1992, polls from the primaries showed that Clinton was appealing to Black Americans, poor whites, and the middle class. In his nomination speech at the Democratic National Convention, Clinton proclaimed the beginning of a new kind of politics. "The choice we offer," Clinton said, "is not conservative or liberal. In many ways, it is not even Republican or Democratic. It is different. And it will work." Though his campaign was mostly focused on domestic issues, Clinton presented himself as a firm advocate of democracy and the

promotion of liberal values far and wide. Vowing to transform welfare and solve the nation's unemployment, he also promised to deliver an America that would not "coddle tyrants," and would instead champion democracy abroad. A few days after the Convention, Al From said of the DLC/PPI machine: "I think we will be for the Clinton administration what the Heritage Foundation was for the Reagan administration… An idea factory to help Bill come up with new approaches."

But in order to ensure Clinton's victory, the New Democrats had one more group to win over: the neoconservatives. These liberal hawks, associated with Senator Henry "Scoop Jackson," had either moved to Republican ranks in the 1970s or still worked within the Democratic Party. In October, just one month before the election, White House adviser Stuart Eizenstat wrote a memorandum for the Clinton campaign titled: "Winning Back the Neo-Conservatives." In it he argued that the neoconservatives, who "had influence far out of proportion to their numbers," could be won back in 1992. To do so, according to Eizenstat, would be "a major crack in the Republican armor." Clinton foreign policy advisors met with key neoconservatives over the next few weeks. That same month, many prominent national security figures, including Samuel P. Huntington and William Odom (both of whom had been involved in the Pew Project from Chapter One), and neoconservatives such as R. James Woolsey, Martin Peretz, Peter Rosenblatt and Penn Kemble, signed onto a Clinton advertisement with a collective endorsement. Their reasons for endorsing Clinton were explicitly tied to his championship of democracy. They expressed their disagreement with Clinton's stance against the

95 ibid.
98 Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 35.
Vietnam War as a young man, but claimed that he was a convincing candidate because of his firm support of democratic movements abroad, which made him preferable to George H.W. Bush, who had shown himself "far too willing to cooperate with dictators, and to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses." The Clinton-Al Gore foreign policy, according to the signers, would be "coherent and firm, yet infused with democratic spirit." Just as Larry Diamond had anticipated, support for democracy was the linchpin for developing a bipartisan consensus.

In the November elections, Clinton benefited from an economic recession and a third candidate, Ross Perot, who destroyed Bush's chances. Bush's 168 electoral votes paled in comparison to Clinton's 370. By early December, Clinton had already staffed his transition team full of DLC/PPI leaders. Al From worked on Clinton's domestic affairs, and DLC's Director of Communications Bruce Reed became the transition's issues director. PPI's Will Marshall focused on Clinton's foreign policy and welfare reform, and Elaine Karmack helped with finance and family affairs. Speaking to reporters about the new administration's foreign policy ideas, Marshall said that it would have to erect "a whole new conceptual basis." "There is now a vacuum," Marshall said. "The old rationale no longer works and the new one isn't clear."

On the eve of Clinton's presidency, PPI published Mandate for Change, a 340-page manifesto containing policy recommendations which, according to the Heritage Foundation, represented a "kind and gentle conservatism." Mandate for Change was based on the Mandate for Leadership, a manifesto published by the Heritage Foundation twelve years earlier, right
before Reagan took office.\textsuperscript{107} In December, copies of PPI's \textit{Mandate for Change} circulated the desks of Clinton's team in Little Rock, Arkansas.\textsuperscript{108}

The only foreign policy section in \textit{Mandate for Change}, written by Will Marshall, was titled "U.S. Global Leadership for Democracy." In the acknowledgements, Marshall thanked Larry Diamond, Samuel P. Huntington, and Clinton's future national security advisors Anthony Lake and Sandy Berger for their help in his writing process. Marshall warned the Administration about the future threats of the 1990s, claiming that the rapid diffusion of technology threatened to put nuclear weapons in the hands of "third-world tyrants" and terrorists, and that states like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea may cause conflicts by seeking regional hegemony.\textsuperscript{109} He then proposed the antidote to these threats, calling for the creation of "Pax Democratica": a world in which the United States supports struggles for democracy in all corners of the globe. In Marshall's view, support for democracy would replace a strategy of containment.\textsuperscript{110} Reiterating Diamond's argument, he argued that only by uniting national interests with American values could the Clinton administration "mobilize and sustain solid, bipartisan support for U.S. global leadership in the new era."\textsuperscript{111} To carry out Marshall's plan, the United States would need to increase foreign aid, reform the military force structure to be geared toward "rapid response to flash points around the world," and revive collective security through the United Nations.\textsuperscript{112} By the end of 1992, the category of rogue states was incipient, and it was closely linked to democracy promotion.

\textsuperscript{108} Lewthwaite, "Think Tank Offers Text for Clinton Years."
\textsuperscript{110} ibid, 291.
\textsuperscript{111} ibid, 297.
\textsuperscript{112} ibid, 308.
When Clinton took office in January of 1993, PPI had, as intended, already become to the Clinton administration what the Heritage Foundation was to the Reagan administration. It served as "the President's brain shop of choice." According to the *Washington Post*, the think tank was "wired into the fledgling Clinton administration like a microchip."\(^{113}\)

When tapped to serve as Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake was living in the hills of Western Massachusetts, teaching classes at Mount Holyoke College, and raising twenty eight cattle. He was writing a book on the Democratic Party and "why we always screw up."\(^{114}\) Described as a "low-profile kind of guy," Lake had retreated to academia after nearly twenty years working at various State Departments posts and in the Carter administration.\(^{115}\) He reluctantly returned to Washington to steer the Clinton administration's search for a grand strategy.

In August, Lake asked his aide Jeremy Rosner, a 34-year-old speechwriter who worked with DLC politicians and Will Marshall, to draft a foreign policy speech with a slogan that was "understandable enough you could put it on a bumper sticker."\(^{116}\) The idea was to find a successor to containment — an organizing principle that would guide Clinton's foreign policy and strike a chord with the American public. Rosner pitched his idea to Lake: if containment during the Cold War aimed to curb the "red blob" of communist states, then America's responsibility now should be to expand the "blue blob" of democracies, through the promotion of democratic institutions and free trade. He invented the doctrine of "democratic enlargement,” and

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\(^{114}\) Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, 30.


\(^{116}\) Chollet and Goldgeier, *America Between the Wars*, 68.
after some helpful speech edits from Georgia Congressman Newt Gingrich, the doctrine was ready to be announced.\textsuperscript{117}

Lake outlined his new doctrine of democratic enlargement at Georgetown University in September of 1993. "Throughout the Cold War," Lake said, "we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach… The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement — enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies." Lake defined democracies as systems that hold elections, have free markets, protect human rights, and have an independent judiciary. To achieve democratic enlargement, the Clinton administration would strengthen the community of big market democracies, promote new democratic institutions and market economies abroad, and mobilize international resources for humanitarian initiatives. Democratic enlargement was, at its core, a liberal and multilateral project.\textsuperscript{118}

The Clinton team was a big believer in multilateralism. They claimed that acting in partnership with the international community could achieve U.S. interests more efficiently than acting alone. But by the time Lake delivered his speech on enlargement, opposition to multilateralism was already underway. Many members of the foreign policy establishment, and of Congress, believed that a strictly multilateral foreign policy threatened to pull the United States into conflicts that served no vital U.S. interests. Lake anticipated this opposition in his enlargement speech, when he asserted that the debate on multilateralism was important, but "dangerous in the rigidity of the doctrines that are asserted." He stated that the Clinton administration would only act multilaterally when doing so would advance U.S. interests, and

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  \item \textsuperscript{117} Ibid, 68.
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that it would be perfectly willing to act unilaterally when necessary. The battle between multilateralists and unilateralists would intensify after the 1994 midterm elections, which will be discussed in Chapter Three.

Ironically, the successor to containment still relied on mechanisms of containment. Expanding the world's democracies required isolating those states that did not fit within a free market, democratic model. Lake argued that a core tenet of democratic enlargement was "minimizing the ability of states outside the circle of democracy and markets to threaten it." These reactionary states, which he called "backlash states," were more likely to sponsor terrorism, seek weapons of mass destruction, threaten their neighbors, and suppress their own people. Lake declared that America’s approach to these states would be coordinated isolation, using diplomatic, economic, and technological measures. He said that although America could not forcibly impose democracy on these states, it may be able to guide them to reform by imposing penalties and raising the costs of aggressive behavior.

Lake provided more details on these “backlash states” in a Foreign Affairs article. He named five "backlash states": Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. These states, according to Lake, were "recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family [of nations] but also assault its basic values." They promoted radical ideologies, suppressed human rights, shared a siege mentality, and pursued weapons of mass destruction. Most importantly, however, they exhibited "a chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world." They were stuck in the past, unwilling to adapt to the global wave of democratization and liberalization. Lake's concept of "backlash states" set into motion the

\[119\] ibid, 26.
\[120\] ibid, 24.
nascent concept of "rogue states." He had created a new classification of states, and designated this class of states to be outside of, and diametrically opposed to, the international community. As the only superpower, Lake argued, America had a "special responsibility" to "neutralize, contain," and eventually transform these states into "constructive members" of the family of nations. This effort to transform "backlash states" was to be a concerted, multilateral endeavor.

The coordination between these two objectives — expanding democracy through the spread of institutions and markets, and isolating those classified as non-democracies — was summed up in an odd metaphor that Lake shared with New York Times reporters. "I think Mother Teresa and Ronald Reagan were both trying to do the same thing— one helping the helpless, one fighting the Evil Empire," Lake said. "One of the nice things about this job is you can do both at the same time and not see them as contradictory." Indeed, segregating rogue states from the international community was not contradictory to the cause of democracy promotion; in Lake's view, it was integral.

A strategy that was fundamental to the Clinton team’s isolation of so-called "backlash states" was Martin Indyk’s doctrine of dual containment. Indyk, who was Special Assistant to the President on Near East and South Asian Affairs, outlined dual containment in a 1993 speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. For much of the eighties, the United States had tilted its policy toward Hussein in order to weaken Iran. But now, Indyk argued, “we don’t need to rely on one to balance the other.” Instead, the United States would contain both Iran

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122 ibid.
and Iraq so that they remained “equally weak for an indefinite period.” According to Indyk, the policy came from the recognition of both regimes' antagonism against the United States and its allies in the Middle East.

For dual containment to work, the United States needed to isolate Iran and Iraq from the international system by using economic sanctions, persuading European allies to impose their own sanctions, and maintaining military commitments to Saudi Arabia and other allies in the Gulf. To some, it was unwise to treat Iran and Iraq, two different states with unique governments, cultures, and histories, as a monolith. But this consolidation of two threats into one set the conditions for the designation of a group of states (including Iran and Iraq) as "rogue states." The Clinton administration would soon see that using a unitary policy toward multiple states would restrict its ability to maneuver foreign policy issues.

Indyk tacitly indicated that dual containment's ultimate goal was regime change. He said that America needed to clearly establish that Iraq's government was "a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society, and, in our judgment, irredeemable." By describing Iraq as irredeemable, Indyk limited, or perhaps even eliminated, the possibility of diplomacy. Just as Lake grouped together Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba and characterized them as incapable of participating in international society, so too had Indyk consolidated U.S. policy towards Iran and Iraq under the same doctrine. Both dual containment and Lake's "backlash states" concept simplified the complexities of international relations. These concepts developed an intellectual framework under which states designated as "bad actors" were beyond reform and unfit to negotiate with.

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126 R. Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, "White House to Step Up Plans To Isolate Iran, Iraq, Administration to Try 'Dual Containment,'" Washington Post, May 23, 1993.
128 Martin Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East," (emphasis added).
Lake concluded his "backlash states" article by casting himself in the model of diplomat George Kennan, the architect of Cold War containment. In Lake's conception, the containment of backlash states emulated the containment of the Soviet Empire. Before the publication of Lake's article, Clinton's National Security Council had deliberated on how to replace containment, in a brainstorming process they dubbed the "Kennan Sweepstakes." But there was a glaring difference between Cold War containment and post-Cold War containment. As Lake himself acknowledged, the task of isolating the "band of outlaws" was a far lesser challenge than containing the "outlaw Empire." Some may have contested the application of the same policy to a much less formidable threat. But to Lake, this threat disparity was only an indication that the United States would decisively prevail.

Despite the confidence reflected in its new doctrines, the Clinton administration's actions abroad lacked coherence. In Clinton's first two years in office, the swiftness with which he abandoned and withheld from operations abroad exposed the doctrines' relatively shaky grounding. Weeks before he left the White House, Bush had deployed American troops to Somalia to assist in a U.N. operation. Upon his arrival in Office, therefore, Clinton did not inherit a clean slate. Somalia was burdened by a violent civil war and a devastating famine. The United States' seemingly low-risk humanitarian mission, originally slated to fight famine, soon devolved into a disaster. By the Fall of 1993, the mission's objectives had changed from fighting famine to restoring government to the country. In October, the Battle of Mogadishu marked the deadliest battle U.S. forces had faced since Vietnam. In its aftermath, the dead bodies of American soldiers were dragged through the streets of Somalis. This horrifying spectacle was

131 Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," 55.
broadcasted on American television, stoking public outrage.\textsuperscript{133} Somalia shattered the assumption that America could intervene militarily without U.S. soldiers getting killed.\textsuperscript{134}

As the chaos unfolded, Clinton admitted: "'Gosh, I miss the Cold War." He confessed that there was a shared nostalgia in the White House of the anti-Soviet blueprint that simplified the past four decades. According to Clinton, creating a new framework for U.S. foreign policy "could take years."\textsuperscript{135} Daniel Benjamin, one of Clinton's speechwriters, described the struggle of settling on a new foreign policy doctrine as "a toothache that wouldn't go away."\textsuperscript{136} Clinton quickly announced the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia by March 31st.\textsuperscript{137}

Merely a week after the disaster in Somalia, Clinton dispatched a U.S. Navy ship, with 200 engineers and military police, to Haiti. The naval operation aimed to facilitate Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's return to power, a goal that the Bush and Clinton Administrations had been working towards since a military junta carried out a coup in 1991. But when the ship arrived at the pier in Port-au-Prince, it was met by a mob of Haitians who threatened violence and even beat a few American reporters. One of the gunmen warned the Americans, "We're going to make a second Somalia here."\textsuperscript{138} With the memory of Mogadishu fresh in the minds of Clinton officials, the ship was ordered to turn back and return to the United States. Clinton appeared unwilling to risk casualties in Haiti. One veteran Congress member said

\textsuperscript{136} Chollet and Goldgeier, \textit{America Between the Wars}, 71.
\textsuperscript{138} All Things Considered, "Chaos Erupts as U.S. Forces Attempt to Enter Haiti," \textit{NPR}, October 11, 1993.
the scene of the U.S. Navy ship turning away from Port-au-Prince symbolized Clinton's foreign policy: "helpless and adrift." They were "bystanders to genocide." 

In April of 1994, headlines about a state-sponsored genocide in Rwanda dominated the news. In only 100 days, 800,000 people were murdered by Hutu extremists. Despite pressure from civil society and human rights organizations, neither the United States nor the United Nations took action to stop the killing spree. Foreign policy observers claimed that the failure in Somalia had crushed the administration's willingness to use military force, coining the term "Somalia Syndrome." When faced with a decision to act or refrain, the Clinton administration's purported support for democracy and human rights fell flat.

The Administration seemed to momentarily recover from these debacles in September, with Operation Uphold Democracy, a mission in which former president Jimmy Carter, retired General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn led a delegation to Haiti to persuade its military junta to step down and facilitate President Aristide's return to power. With American planes already in the air ready to invade the country, the delegation successfully convinced the junta to relinquish its power. After six months of U.S. military occupation, the peacekeeping mission was handed over to the U.N. and Aristide was restored to the presidency.

Notwithstanding this recuperation in Haiti, Clinton admitted to his close friend Arthur Schlesinger in October: "People don't understand what we're trying to do. We need to spell out the framework." Though Lake, Indyk, and the rest of the Clinton team had made every effort

to invent phrases, concepts, and doctrines to sloganize their vision of America's role in the world, their work had come up short. The administration felt deficient. It provided firm rhetorical support for America's leadership of the world order, but its actual conduct was disorderly and could not meet such grand objectives. Foreign policy thinkers described Clinton's foreign policy as confused, "clumsy," "in disarray," and lacking clarity and consistency about priorities.\textsuperscript{145}

The concept of "backlash states" — which would soon develop into "rogue states" — was an attempt to mitigate this aimlessness. In a post-Soviet world that could no longer be divided into two political and economic spheres, categorizing a cavalcade of enemies as its own class of states clarified the necessity of U.S. global activism. After the Clinton administration's first two years of foreign policy fiascos, Congress and members of the foreign policy establishment doubted its competence. As I will show in the next chapter, the "rogue states" concept finally emerged in the Clinton administration's vocabulary after the midterm elections, in the face of escalating dissent from new congressional Republicans.

With the 1994 midterm elections fast approaching, neoconservative Robert Kagan attempted to mobilize the Republican Party to rise to the challenge and lead the cause of "global activism." Kagan criticized the Clinton administration, which, although supposedly willing to assert U.S. power abroad, was still plagued by Vietnam Syndrome. "They seek the fruits of American intervention," Kagan claimed, "yet seem incapable of doing what is necessary to secure them." The Republicans were the only party that had the confidence to assert American power. But the Party was undergoing a transformation, with more Republicans calling for cuts in the defense budget and a reduction in Clinton's humanitarian interventions. "The Republican

party is less and less recognizable as the party of Ronald Reagan or the George Bush who sent troops to Panama and the Persian Gulf," Kagan wrote.\textsuperscript{146} At this point, Kagan's rallying call was futile. He would soon see that the Republican Party's transformations were inexorable.

III. "Foreign Policy as Social Work"

The Republican Revolution and the Specter of Isolationism

In January of 1996, Michael Mandelbaum, a foreign policy academic who advised Clinton during his campaign but was mysteriously refused a position on his transition team, wrote a scathing review of Clinton's first few years as Commander in Chief. The *Foreign Affairs* article was titled: "Foreign Policy as Social Work." Mandelbaum pointed out that the Clinton administration had launched three failed invasions in its first nine months. In May of 1993, the Administration failed to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia's Muslims and to bomb the Bosnian Serbs. In October of that same year, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in Somalia, and a U.S. Navy ship retreated from Port-au-Prince, signaling a symbolic victory for the Haitian military leaders who led the 1991 coup d'etat against Aristide. According to Mandelbaum, Clinton and his national security team were conducting foreign policy in the model of Mother Teresa, operating on the basis of humanitarianism rather than U.S. interests. "They tried, and failed, to turn American foreign policy into a branch of social work," Mandelbaum wrote. Mandelbaum's catchphrase "foreign policy as social work" encapsulated the feelings of many of the freshman Republicans who joined Congress after the midterm elections of 1994. These congressional Republicans opposed Clinton's embrace of multilateralism and the U.N., and were

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unwilling to pour resources into humanitarian missions that they saw as wasteful and bound to fail.\footnote{149}{Kim Homes, \textit{Clinton's Red Herring: The Accusations of Congressional Isolationism} (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1995).} To be clear, these Republicans did not believe that the United States should retreat from the world—they preferred a more unilateral foreign policy, and claimed that Clinton's military blunders and flip flops were destroying U.S. credibility. Their opposition to Clinton's vision of American foreign policy is integral to the story of "rogue states."

Republicans swept the midterm elections of 1994, picking up 8 seats in the Senate and winning a net gain of 54 seats in the House. The elections, also known as the Republican Revolution of 1995, were a major victory for the conservatism of Newt Gingrich's Contract with America, the legislative agenda which was signed by all non-incumbent Republican congressional candidates. For the Democrats, the results of the midterm elections represented a rupture with the past. The Democrats had lost control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. When the 104th Congress convened on January 3rd, 1995, it was the first time that the Republicans had control of both houses since 1954.\footnote{150}{Dan Balz, "After the Republican Sweep," \textit{Washington Post}, November 10, 1994.}

Newt Gingrich's Contract With America was a domestically-focused agenda, aiming to fight crime, cut welfare, and provide greater incentives to small businesses. The only foreign policy provision in the Contract was The National Security Revitalization Act, an act that would cut funding for U.N. peace operations and prevent U.S. troops from serving under U.N. command, unless the President deemed it necessary for national security. The National Revitalization Act was introduced in the House one day after Congress first convened. It was passed by the House a month later.\footnote{151}{U.S. Congress, House. \textit{American Overseas Interests Act of 1995}. HR 1561.104th Cong., 1st ses. Congressional Record. \url{https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/house-report/128}}
Another bill introduced by the new congressional Republicans, the American Overseas Interests Act, would fold three independent foreign affairs agencies — the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development and the Information Agency — into the State Department, and cut 2.8 billion from the 21.6 billion foreign affairs budget proposed by the Clinton administration. When the House opened up debate on the Bill, Clinton called it one of the "most isolationist proposals in 50 years," and a "frontal assault" on presidential authority. He accused the Republicans of producing "shortsighted, scatter-shot" budget cuts" in an attempt to "micromanage" policy. Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent a letter to House Leader Newt Gingrich summarizing the Administration's opposition to the Bill. He wrote: "Last November's elections may have changed the balance of power between the parties. But they did not change — indeed, they enhanced — our responsibility to cooperate on a bipartisan basis in foreign affairs." He argued that U.S. foreign policy could not be supported "on the cheap." The Administration's announcement of its intention to veto only pushed the Republicans further away. In their debates on the House floor, they proposed an additional $478 million in cuts.

These bills compelled the Clinton administration to launch a rhetorical campaign against the congressional Republicans, whom they deemed "the new isolationists." In March, Clinton was slated to give a speech at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. An unnamed advisor's notes proposed that the speech was an opportunity to "take a strong whack at Congress for rushing a hollow foreign policy." Clinton did just that; he claimed that the legislative actions of the "new isolationists" had the potential to "literally destroy hopes for a more democratic, more

prosperous, safer world.\textsuperscript{156} Lake reiterated Clinton's talking points. Speaking to the National Press Club, he claimed that U.S. engagement was "under siege." The new isolationists, according to Lake, threatened to lead America down the wrong path by "frittering away our victory in the Cold War." He then pointed to the threats that faced America — "aggression by rogue states, international terrorism, and economic dislocation" — which he claimed were new forms of an old conflict, "the conflict between the defenders of open society and its enemies.\textsuperscript{157}

In a strategic move, Clinton attempted to appease Congress by issuing Presidential Directive 25, which declared that the United States would not support a standing U.N. army, nor would it earmark U.S. military units for participation in U.N. operations.\textsuperscript{158} The Directive failed to assuage House Speaker Newt Gingrich's gripes. He claimed that Clinton still entertained the "multinational fantasy" and wished to "subordinate the United States to the United Nations."\textsuperscript{159}

Congressional opposition to multilateral activism brought about a deep fear of isolationism in the Clinton administration. According to NSC staffer Daniel Benjamin, "there was a persistent fear in the White House, and it was a well-based fear, that isolationism was going to return." To ward off this possibility, the Clinton team spent an "awful lot of effort … to maintain public consciousness of foreign policy challenges."\textsuperscript{160} The opposition to Clinton's vision of U.S. foreign policy was not confined to Washington, D.C. This was a moment in which the American public was generally apathetic about U.S. activism abroad. A survey conducted in October 1994 by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations" was down to its lowest level since 1974, and


\textsuperscript{160} Alex Miles, \textit{U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine}, 35.
had decreased 24 points since 1990. "Protecting and defending human rights in other countries"
had also reached its lowest level since 1978.\textsuperscript{161} This change in American public opinion raised
the stakes in the administration's battle with the "new isolationists."

As the Clinton team launched its offensive against congressional Republicans, "rogue
states" became a prevalent and frequently-repeated phrase in foreign policy speeches. The threat
of rogue states was leveraged by the Clinton administration as a shield against domestic
opposition to foreign policy initiatives. The data below shows that mentions of "rogue states" or
"rogue state" in Clinton's public statements spiked as the administration began condemning the
"new isolationists" in Congress.

\textbf{Tracing "Rogue States."}\textsuperscript{162}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Mentions of "Rogue States" or "Rogue State" in Clinton's Public Statements (1992-2000)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{161} John E. Reilly (ed.), \textit{American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy} (Chicago: Chicago Council on
Foreign Affairs, 1995), 16.
\textsuperscript{162} A brief note on methodology:

For President Clinton's public statements, I used UC Santa Barbara's American Presidency Project digital archive, searching for the terms "rogue states" or "rogue state" for Figure 1, and "isolationism" or "isolationists" for Figure 2. I then relied on congress.gov to search the congressional record for the terms "rogue states" or "rogue state" between 1988 and 2000. For the media analysis in Figure 3, I searched for the terms "rogue states" or "rogue state" between 1988 and 2000 on the digital archives of \textit{Foreign Policy} and \textit{Foreign Affairs}, and on the ProQuest digital archives of \textit{the New York Times} and \textit{the Washington Post}. 
Figure 2

Mentions of "Isolationism" or "Isolationists" in Clinton's Public Statements (1992-2000)

Figure 3

Mentions of "Rogue States" or "Rogue State" in the Congressional Record (1989-2000)
As Figure 1 shows, the terms "rogue states" and "rogue state" emerged in Clinton's speeches in the second half of his first administration, starting in 1994 and surging from 1995 to 1996. Just as "rogue states" emerged in Clinton's statements, his use of the terms "isolationists" and "isolationism" peaked. The administration's rhetorical attack against isolationism, therefore, concurred with its threat construction of rogue states. In many cases, such as in his 1995 speeches at the Veterans of Foreign War Conference and at the celebration of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, Clinton introduced the concept of rogue states directly after airing his grievances about the "new isolationists" in Congress. In his framing, rogue states

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163 See Figure 2.
were one of the dangers that necessitated America's global leadership, the very leadership that congressional Republicans threatened to relinquish.

This concept of rogue states traveled throughout the broader foreign policy establishment. Figure 3 shows that Congress was prolific in its use of the terms "rogue states" and "rogue state" after 1994. Use of the term skyrocketed after the 1994 midterm elections, jumping from 25 uses in the 1993-1994 congressional term to 73 in the following term. The media analysis in Figure 4 reveals that the terms "rogue states" and "rogue state" were nearly nonexistent in top media outlets before 1994. This is understandable given that enlargement, Lake's "backlash states" concept, and dual containment were all released in late 1993 and 1994. The figures show that by 1996, the terms "rogue states" and "rogue state" were widely used in Washington and in the media.

A "Foreign Policy Talking Points" document drafted by Clinton's chief foreign policy speechwriter Anthony Blinken in January 1996 illustrates the link between the Administration's ideas of "isolationism" and "rogue states." The document is a series of bullet points, each with a main argument in bold typeface, followed by phrases to use in relation to the argument.\textsuperscript{165} The second bullet point was "\textbf{The World Looks to Us:} Not just for size and strength, but for what we stand for and against." The third point read:

\textit{"Can't Be Isolationist:} After Cold War, some say we should pull back. They're wrong. Threats we face have no respect for borders: ethnic, religious hatred...rogue states...nuke...terror...crime...drug...environment."\textsuperscript{166}

Blinken's framing uncovers the Clinton administration's effort to emphasize the threat of rogue states, along with other threats, to combat the rationale for a military retreat. In accordance


\textsuperscript{166} ibid, 2.
with Blinken’s Talking Points, Clinton and Lake portrayed rogue states as amorphous and unconstrained by borders. In their conception, rogue states were porous; they exported terrorism and dangerous weapons across borders. This boundless quality made the menace of rogue states ill-defined. If rogue states posed a threat that was not limited to state borders, then America would need to stay active in shaping all world affairs.

The band of states designated as "rogues" by the Clinton team typically included Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and sometimes Cuba. One of the key assumptions about these states was that they were not susceptible to deterrence like the Soviet Union was. Rogue states, in the administration's formulation, did not behave rationally or even according to their own interests. Moreover, they were non-democratic, so they were not moderated by the need for domestic approval. Implicit in this intellectual framework was the notion that the United States could not negotiate with such states. This set the conditions for the administration to be constrained in its range of actions. Clinton would not be able to pursue constructive diplomacy with the states designated as rogue, without subjecting himself to high domestic political costs.

These political costs were exemplified when the administration achieved a deal with North Korea. In 1994, tensions with the country escalated when it began removing spent fuel rods from a nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. These fuel rods contained enough plutonium to produce 4 or 5 bombs. Throughout the year, Clinton was seriously considering war, and even


\[\text{\textsuperscript{168}}\text{Steven Mufson, "Threat of 'Rogue' States: Reality or Rhetoric?" Washington Post, May 29, 2000.}\]

received a detailed plan to strike North Korean nuclear sites.\textsuperscript{170} After unsuccessfully pursuing a sanctions package through the U.N. Security Council, the Clinton administration sought the help of Former President Jimmy Carter. Carter acted as an unofficial U.S. envoy and helped facilitate a breakthrough in U.S.-North Korean relations: the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework, signed in October 1994, set guidelines for future cooperation between America and North Korea, and called for the freezing and dismantling of its nuclear program.\textsuperscript{171}

Despite the sheer success of this diplomatic feat, it was met with harsh criticism at home. A month after the Framework was signed, columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote that Clinton needed to stop his "gestures of weakness," and give thought to a preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear sites. He called for Clinton to ratchet up pressure on Kim Il Sung, rather than relaxing it.\textsuperscript{172} Others, and especially Congressional Republicans, echoed these criticisms, accusing Clinton of " appeasement," and of "propping up an odious regime."\textsuperscript{173} These criticisms affirmed the idea that North Korea was a "rogue state"—it was not to be negotiated with.\textsuperscript{174} The rogue states concept, therefore, raised the political cost associated with pursuing diplomacy with so-called "rogues."

The notion that these states were irredeemable prompted Congress to oppose the Administration's measures toward them, in support of tougher unilateral approaches. For instance, by late 1995, Republicans in Congress no longer supported the strategy of dual containment. Instead of containing and moderating the behavior of Iran through multilateral


measures, they suggested that the Clinton administration should strategize for the "replacement of the current regime in Iran."\(^{175}\) From Newt Gingrich's perspective, even a total embargo on Iran would not effectively topple the Islamic Republic. Covert, unilateral regime change was the only strategy that made sense to him.\(^{176}\) To pursue this regime change plan against what he called "the most dangerous country in the world," Gingrich called for $100 million in the 1996 Intelligence Authorization Bill to support programs that could help overthrow the Iranian government.\(^{177}\)

Gingrich's desire for an anti-Iran fund deadlocked the bill for over a month, until the administration negotiated and allowed for $18 million to be designated for covert operations in Iran. The funds were not, as Gingrich had hoped, aimed at directly toppling the Iranian government. Instead, the money would finance opposition groups and attempt to curb Iran's extremist policies.\(^{178}\)

On the periphery of these partisan battles were Kristol and Kagan, two neoconservatives who believed they had a grander vision of America's role in the world. In the summer of 1996, Kristol and Kagan argued that American conservatives were "adrift" and lacked a clear vision for U.S. foreign policy. Congressional Republicans criticized the multilateral, humanitarian-focused foreign policy of the Clinton administration, but according to Kristol and Kagan, they lacked a clear alternative. The authors called for a "neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence," wherein the United States assumed a role of "benevolent global hegemony." They claimed that the "ubiquitous post-Cold War question — where is the threat?"

was misconceived: "The main threat the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness."\textsuperscript{179}

By the turn of the century, Kristol and Kagan formed the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think tank that affirmed its principles were essential if the United States was to build on its Cold War victory and ensure its preeminence in the next century.\textsuperscript{180} Of the twenty-five people who signed PNAC's Statement of Principles, ten, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, would serve in the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{181} Clinton lost the neoconservatives that he had fought to win over earlier in the decade. What was once a fringe movement was gaining steam, and this would have catastrophic consequences for the beginning of the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{182} Vaïsse, Justin. \textit{Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement}, 158.
Conclusion

In June of 2000, merely three years after delivering her Tennessee State University speech on isolating "the rogues," Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that "rogue states" would now be called "states of concern."\(^{183}\) When asked why the Administration was abandoning the term, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher explained: "the category has outlived its usefulness… a single description, 'one size fits all,' doesn't really fit anymore."\(^{184}\) He indicated that behavior changes shown by the previously-rogue states Libya, Iran, and North Korea motivated the State Department's substitution in vocabulary. In particular, he commended the victory of reformist candidates in Iran's parliamentary elections, Libya's decision to hand over two suspects for trial in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, and Kim Jong Il's decision to halt missile testing and attend a summit meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung.\(^{185}\) Boucher quickly dismissed concerns that the United States would go soft on the formerly-rogue states: "It's not really a change in…what we're doing as much as it is finding a better description."\(^{186}\)

This change in the lexicon did not, however, eliminate the conceptual framework that underpinned the "rogue states" category, nor did it remove the term from the foreign policy establishment. The classification of the formerly-rogue states as a separate, outlaw class of states


\(^{186}\) Mufson, "A 'Rogue' Is a 'Rogue' Is a 'State of Concern.'"
remained, as did the notion that these states needed to be punished and isolated from the global community. In the next administration, the rogue states concept would return with a vengeance.

In September, just before the election that would bring George W. Bush to power, the neoconservatives at PNAC published a 90-page document on "rebuilding America's defenses." The authors claimed that their vision of military primacy was so bold that achieving it would be challenging, "absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event — like a new Pearl Harbor." A year later, when nearly 3,000 people were killed in the September 11 attacks, these same pundits saw the atrocity as a window of opportunity. Merely a week after the Twin Towers fell, PNAC sent a letter to President Bush calling for a regime change war in Iraq: "Even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the [9/11] attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq." The PNAC neconservatives launched a campaign to implement their vision of U.S. foreign policy — "benevolent hegemony"— under the guise of fighting terrorism.

As pressure mounted in Washington to avenge the terrorists who attacked the American homeland, President Bush announced that the United States had begun striking al-Qaeda training camps and military installations of the Taliban in Afghanistan. America's war in Afghanistan would last for the next twenty years. About a year later, President George W. Bush proclaimed that the United States would do everything in its power to defeat what he called the "axis of evil," a congregation of states who were aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction and exporting terrorism. The three members of this "axis of evil," Iran, Iraq, and North Korea,
were familiar enemies. They were the same states included in the category of "rogue states" as it was conceived by the Clinton administration. Bush's formulation of the "axis of evil" was rooted in the intellectual work of the previous decade. The categorization of these same states as "rogue states" by the Clinton administration paved the way for George W. Bush and his team to create the "axis of evil." Just like "rogue states," the "axis of evil" was not constrained by borders. This boundlessness authorized the United States to pursue a limitless, endless war against terrorism. In other words, the "rogue states" concept established a rhetorical precedent for the War on Terror.

On March 19th, 2003, Bush began a new phase of the War on Terror: the invasion of Iraq. U.S. policymakers insisted that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons. PNAC preempted any desires for a quick exit by releasing a letter on the same day, proclaiming that America would "remain for as long as it takes" to rebuild Iraq and lay the foundation for a democratic state in the country. Any early focus on departure deadlines, PNAC claimed, would undermine America's credibility.191 The letter was signed by two unexpected supporters: New Democrat Will Marshall, the President of PPI who helped craft Clinton's foreign policy for democracy, and Martin Indyk, the architect of the strategy of dual containment.192 The very thinkers who invented the rogue states category had fused once again with the neoconservatives. Fifteen New Democrat analysts then co-wrote a PPI report in October entitled *Progressive Internationalism: A Democratic National Security Strategy.* Among the authors were Will Marshall, Larry Diamond (the author of *An American Foreign Policy for Democracy*) and Jeremy Rosner (the White House aide who crafted Anthony Lake's doctrine of democratic enlargement). In their report, these New

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Democrats formally endorsed the Iraq invasion, aligning themselves with PNAC and the Bush administration. They made a point to differentiate themselves from the neoconservatives by claiming that their support came from a humanitarian, multilateralist standpoint: Hussein was undermining "collective security and international law." Nonetheless, what the Democratic Leadership Council had hoped for in 1989 — a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy — was finally consummated.

Marshall and his PPI co-authors were committed to the War on Terror for the long haul. To them, America could not and should not attempt a quick exit. "The struggle we face today is likely to last not years but decades," they wrote. Indeed, the invasion of Iraq set off what would become a twenty-year War on Terror. From rogue states, to the axis of evil, to the Global War on Terror, the U.S. foreign policy establishment has envisioned grand projects for America in the world. Yet the consequences of endless war cast doubt on whether these projects were wise to begin with. From 2001 onwards, the United States never officially declared war on any nation. It did, however, engage in military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, Kenya, Somalia, and more countries, all in the name of defeating terror.

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